Why El-Sayed Victory May Not Alter Washington’s Relationship With Egypt
Samir Ragheb, President of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies told TML that although El-Sayed ‘carries weight across the Arab and Muslim worlds … Cairo heard criticism,’ in his remarks about the Egyptian government
By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line
From Cairo to the Gulf, analysts see the Democratic takeover of Congress as a potential turning point for US military assistance, relations with Israel, and the confrontation with Iran, while stressing that Arab governments are unlikely to abandon their long-term strategic calculations.
The Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the US midterm elections, securing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, has raised new questions across the Middle East about the future of Washington’s regional policies, its military commitments, and the balance of power between the White House and Congress.
For Arab countries, the implications extend beyond President Donald Trump’s and the Republican Party’s domestic political defeat. With the ongoing confrontation involving Iran, growing scrutiny of American military assistance to Israel, and the emergence of progressive Arab and Muslim political figures in Washington, the election results are being examined through the broader lens of regional security and economic interests.
For Egypt, El-Sayed’s victory presents a more complicated picture.
Although his Egyptian background and criticism of American military involvement in the Middle East attracted attention, his previous remarks about Egypt’s political system generated controversy.
“Abdul El-Sayed carries weight across the Arab and Muslim worlds. He is a Muslim of Egyptian descent and the first Muslim elected to the US Senate. His positions on Gaza and his opposition to the Iran war won him wide sympathy in the Arab street, the Egyptian street included. We felt it here too. But his statements after his primary win changed that,” Samir Ragheb, President of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, told The Media Line.
“He said his family came from “a country without democracy” and said he would not fund what he called a “strangling grip” on the Egyptian people. Cairo heard criticism, not friendship, and public opinion split. Supporters of the national path found his words offensive. Others asked why an American politician would take such a position against Egypt,” he added.
El-Sayed’s remarks, made after his Democratic primary victory in August, targeted US taxpayer funding and what he described as a lack of democracy in Egypt. He has also opposed unconditional American military assistance to other countries, including Israel.
Ragheb cautioned against assuming that an American politician’s ethnic or religious identity would necessarily translate into policies favorable to the country of his family’s origin.
“Perspective matters. He is one of a hundred senators. We do not see him as an enemy or as a friend. We do not count on him to do good, and we do not fear he will do harm. He is American first, born and raised in the US, and his loyalties lie there. We may welcome him, but we should not mistake him for one of us. His real impact is yet to unfold,” he noted.
His assessment underscores a distinction between the symbolic importance of Arab and Muslim representation in American institutions and the practical consequences such representation may have for bilateral relations.
Yet assessments from Egypt and Bahrain suggest that the Democratic victory does not necessarily translate into an immediate transformation of American foreign policy. Instead, it imposes new political constraints on an administration that will retain executive power for another two years, while Arab governments continue pursuing strategies to reduce their dependence on Washington.
“The Democratic wins in both the House and the Senate come as no surprise to those tracking recent US polling and public sentiment,” a former Bahraini diplomat told The Media Line, requesting anonymity and attribution only by that description.
The November 3 elections handed Democrats control of both chambers of Congress, following a campaign dominated by concerns over the cost of living, the economic consequences of the Iran war, and dissatisfaction with the Trump administration’s policies.
The incoming Congress, which takes office on January 3, 2027, will have greater authority to conduct oversight, investigate administration decisions, and influence federal spending. Nevertheless, Trump will remain president and retain significant power over diplomacy, military operations, and foreign policy.
For Cairo, this distinction remains fundamental.
“Congress has changed hands, but Egypt’s calculations have not. Cairo watches the shift calmly and confidently, because it has prepared for it,” Ragheb said.
“The Egyptian state deals with the White House first. President Trump keeps the executive for two more years. But Congress holds the purse, and a Democratic Congress can now shape US military aid to Egypt in ways the president cannot block. Expect closer scrutiny of aid and arms sales in committee,” he added.
Ragheb’s assessment reflects the importance Egypt places on maintaining working relationships with successive American administrations, regardless of their political affiliation. However, congressional control over appropriations and oversight could put additional pressure on the bilateral relationship, particularly on military financing and arms transfers.
Congress can attach conditions to assistance, conduct investigations, and influence future appropriations. However, significant changes to spending legislation remain subject to the broader legislative process, including the president’s veto authority.
Egypt remains one of Washington’s principal military partners in the Middle East, a relationship consolidated following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
US military assistance has long served both countries’ strategic interests, including military cooperation, regional stability, and the maintenance of Egypt’s relationship with Israel.
For fiscal year 2026, Congress approved $1.375 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Egypt, with $320 million subject to human rights and other conditions, along with provisions allowing waivers on national security grounds.
In October, the Trump administration waived human rights-related conditions for $320 million in fiscal 2025 military assistance, citing Egypt’s contribution to regional security following the escalation involving Iran.
The election of a Democratic majority therefore raises questions about whether Congress could demand more oversight, particularly on human rights, weapons transfers, and the conditions attached to future assistance.
Ragheb, however, argued that Egypt has already considered alternatives should Washington reconsider its financial commitments.
“On aid, Egypt is ready for every scenario. America gains from having Egypt as a friend, more than Egypt gains from the aid. Egypt has other sources of arms and other sources of financing. The Chinese and Russian options are open,” he noted.
“If Washington withholds aid, it has nothing left to punish Egypt with. Egypt can buy tanker aircraft from China, the S-400 and the Su-35 from Russia, and fighters from China’s J family. This does not worry us. Trump’s term released some frozen aid, but it did not raise the aid’s value. It did not solve the two core problems either, credit and cash flow financing,” he added.
Although Ragheb characterized American assistance as unchanged, the fiscal 2026 military financing allocation was $75 million higher than Egypt’s longstanding annual baseline of approximately $1.3 billion.
His references to Chinese and Russian weapons systems describe potential procurement alternatives rather than confirmed Egyptian purchases.
The broader question is whether a Democratic Congress could encourage Cairo to further diversify its military partnerships, or whether its established strategic relationship with Washington would remain strong enough to withstand additional political scrutiny.
Beyond relations between governments, the election results have also drawn attention for the success of progressive candidates, including politicians of Arab and Muslim backgrounds who challenged established positions on US foreign policy.
Among the most significant developments was the election of Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan, making him the first Muslim elected to the United States Senate.
El-Sayed, an American politician of Egyptian descent, defeated Republican Mike Rogers after a closely watched campaign in which American military assistance to Israel, the war with Iran, and the influence of political lobbying organizations became prominent issues.
His victory followed considerable spending by groups aligned with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had opposed his candidacy.
For the former Bahraini diplomat, the significance of these victories extends beyond the identities of individual candidates.
“The success of several progressive, Arab, and Muslim candidates, despite facing heavily funded opposition, signals a noticeable shift in domestic political dynamics. Coupled with AIPAC’s decision to keep its donor list private and Trump’s election evening comments about halting financial aid to Israel early next year, it is clear that the US-Israel partnership is no longer immune to public debate.”
He added, “American voters are increasingly questioning unconditional foreign intervention and military spending, particularly in the Arab World.”
The diplomat’s assessment comes as Israel has become an increasingly prominent issue in American elections.
On October 21, AIPAC announced that it would stop directly endorsing candidates and making direct political action committee contributions, while its affiliated super PAC would continue operating. That announcement should be distinguished from the diplomat’s characterization of a decision concerning donor-list privacy.
On November 3, Trump also announced that the United States would stop providing roughly $4 billion in annual assistance to Israel after the end of 2026, saying that an understanding had been reached with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The announcement came despite an existing US-Israel military assistance agreement providing $3.8 billion annually through September 2028. President Trump did not explain how the funding would end ahead of that timetable, raising questions about implementation and Congress’s role.
The political significance of these developments is considerable, although they do not necessarily indicate a consensus within the Democratic Party over future relations with Israel.
The confrontation between Washington, Israel, and Tehran represents another major concern for the region following the midterm elections.
The Democratic victory comes amid continued uncertainty over the direction of American military operations against Iran and the possibility of further escalation.
The former Bahraini diplomat interpreted the election outcome as potentially favorable to Tehran’s broader strategic calculations, particularly if stronger Democratic representation limits the Trump administration’s ability to sustain prolonged military commitments.
“Also from a geopolitical standpoint, Tehran seems to have been watching these developments closely. Iran’s strategy was never built on direct military confrontation on the US soil, but it instead relied on strategic patience, asymmetric attrition, leveraging prolonged negotiations, maritime friction, and high energy prices to strain US domestic optics.”
He continued, “In Tehran’s eyes, a constrained Republican leadership and a stronger progressive presence in Washington could count as a tactical win in the current conflic.”
The assessment points to the domestic political costs of sustained military involvement in the Middle East, particularly when disruptions to energy markets place additional pressure on American consumers.
Nevertheless, congressional control does not automatically determine military policy. The president retains significant authority over the armed forces, while Congress can influence military funding, oversight, and the legal framework governing American involvement.
The period between the election and the beginning of the new congressional session consequently presents an additional source of uncertainty.
“However, the transition window leading into early next year remains critical. With full authority still in place until the new Congress takes office, a bold military move against Iran, and any subsequent retaliation across the Gulf, to set a new reality on the ground remains possible,” the Bahraini diplomat said.
The diplomat’s warning highlights the distinction between the political consequences of an election and the administration’s remaining capacity to make consequential military decisions.
Whether the Democratic victory ultimately translates into a different approach toward Tehran will depend on the interaction between congressional pressure, the administration’s strategic objectives, and developments in the conflict itself.
For Arab states, however, the implications of the elections are not limited to Washington’s decisions.
Regional security arrangements have undergone significant changes as governments seek alternatives to their longstanding dependence on American military protection.
Saudi Arabia’s growing defense cooperation with Pakistan and Turkey has become one example of this trend. In August, the three countries signed a joint defense agreement intended to strengthen cooperation and collective deterrence.
Ragheb argued that these developments reflect a broader strategic reassessment that predates the American elections and is unlikely to be reversed by the change in congressional leadership.
“On regional security, the region has already adjusted. Washington stepped back from defending its friends, and the states of the region rearranged their own defense. Egypt works with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a defense pact with Pakistan and growing ties with Turkey. These arrangements are in place, and a change in Congress will not change them. A new trend is coming. Arab states will rely less on America for their arms,” he said.
“They will build weapons together, through joint manufacturing, and turn to partners beyond Washington. No US election will change that when it comes to Arab collective defense and national security,” Ragheb continued.
His argument suggests that the diversification of defense partnerships is increasingly viewed as a long-term strategic objective rather than a temporary reaction to individual American administrations.
Such arrangements do not necessarily mean that Arab governments intend to abandon Washington. Instead, they reflect efforts to expand their military options, strengthen regional cooperation, and reduce exposure to political decisions made outside the region.
This approach also helps explain why the Democratic victory is being assessed with caution rather than interpreted exclusively as an opportunity or a setback.
The new congressional majority may introduce different priorities concerning military assistance, foreign intervention, and relations with Israel, but Arab governments must also account for the continuity of American executive power and their existing strategic relationships.
For Egypt, Ragheb maintained that geography and regional diplomacy will remain central to the country’s importance for both American political parties.
“Egypt’s strategic weight does not change with an election. Gaza, Rafah, the Suez Canal, and regional stability make Cairo a partner both parties need. Egypt’s strategy is clear. It does not side with a party. It sides with its own interests and works with everyone in Washington, the White House and Congress alike,” he said.
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