Starlink Slowed, Ukraine’s Drones Stalled: The Private Power Behind a Modern War
Restrictions on satellite connectivity disrupted Ukrainian operations, exposing the military risks of relying on commercial technology that governments and armed forces cannot fully control
By Giorgia Valente / The Media Line
The sudden disruption of satellite communications used by Ukrainian forces on October 14 has exposed a growing vulnerability in modern warfare: Military operations increasingly depend on privately operated technology whose availability can be restricted without warning.
The limitations imposed on services provided by Elon Musk’s SpaceX interrupted Ukrainian drone missions, including operations intended to counter Russian attacks. The incident has triggered a dispute over who authorized the restrictions and renewed questions about the influence commercial satellite providers can exert over military operations.
The implications extend beyond Ukraine to the Middle East, where Starlink technology has played a role in US military operations against Iran while also providing civilians with a way to circumvent government-imposed internet restrictions.
Ukrainian officials reported that satellite terminals had stopped maintaining reliable connections when mounted on equipment traveling faster than approximately 160 kilometers per hour (100 mph). Some military units experienced disruptions at lower speeds, forcing them to cancel or interrupt drone missions.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that the restrictions had impaired Ukraine’s ability to intercept faster Russian drones. Although some services were subsequently restored, limitations on high-speed operations remained in place as Kyiv sought a resolution.
On October 22, The Wall Street Journal reported that President Donald Trump had called Musk a day earlier and asked him to lift the restrictions. US and Ukrainian officials said the system was operating more normally on Thursday, although some Ukrainian officials reported that full functionality had not been restored.
The disruption came during heightened tensions between Washington and Kyiv over Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil facilities. However, whether those disagreements influenced the restrictions has not been established.
The question of responsibility has produced conflicting accounts.
On October 15, Reuters reported, citing two American officials and a Western official familiar with the matter, that the order to slow the military satellite service originated inside the White House.
On October 20, The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk had personally ordered the slowdown, citing US officials and people familiar with the decision.
President Trump denied involvement in the original restrictions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently said that decisions about the speed and permitted use of SpaceX services were governed by commercial arrangements rather than White House directives.
Rubio also said Ukraine did not have access to Starshield, SpaceX’s military-oriented satellite service, contradicting Ukrainian officials and US senators who said the service had been restricted.
The conflicting explanations have drawn scrutiny from Congress. On October 15, a bipartisan group of senators called for a Pentagon inspector general investigation into the disruptions. Four Democratic senators followed on October 19 with a letter demanding that SpaceX clarify its role in restricting Ukraine’s access to satellite services.
Beyond the immediate political dispute, the episode has exposed the risks of building military capabilities around infrastructure controlled by an outside provider.
Patrick Bolder, a strategic adviser at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies who specializes in European defense, NATO, and military space operations, told The Media Line that Ukraine’s reliance on Starlink has grown far beyond what its developers originally envisioned.
“Starlink wasn’t designed for military operations because it was designed for civil use,” Bolder said.
Nevertheless, the network has become integral to Ukrainian military operations since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.
John King, founder of Q Advisory, described the technology’s appeal to military planners.
“Starlink has become a major source of military advantage because it connects people, sensors and commanders when conventional communications are damaged or unavailable. Its low Earth orbit network provides broadband with relatively little delay. The strategic value is the speed with which information can move between those who observe a threat and those responsible for responding.”
For Ukrainian forces, satellite internet has become part of an interconnected command system rather than simply a backup means of communication. King illustrated what that means during a military operation.
“Losing a connection can interrupt several activities at once: receiving video, sharing a warning, coordinating units or controlling a connected platform.”
The October incident also brought attention to the distinction between two SpaceX services whose names have sometimes been used interchangeably.
Starlink is SpaceX’s commercial satellite broadband service, originally developed for civilian and business customers. Starshield, which builds on Starlink technology, is designed for government and national security applications, including secure communications, Earth observation, and specialized satellite payloads.
Although the systems share technological foundations, they do not necessarily provide identical capabilities or operate under the same contractual arrangements.
King said the distinction is important when interpreting claims about what Ukrainian forces have lost.
“Ukraine’s communications service should therefore not be confused with every intelligence capability associated with the Starshield name. Carrying intelligence over a network is different from collecting that intelligence.”
Musk has argued that Starshield systems fall under US government control, while Rubio has described decisions about commercial service restrictions as matters for SpaceX. Ukrainian officials, meanwhile, have reported disruptions affecting services they identify as Starshield.
The precise division of technical, contractual, and operational authority remains disputed.
For Bolder, the situation raises broader concerns about Washington’s approach to Ukraine. He argued that restricting military assistance and communications capabilities could increase pressure on Kyiv to accept unfavorable terms in negotiations with Russia.
King was more cautious about drawing broader strategic conclusions from the disruption.
“A restriction on Ukrainian connectivity can benefit Moscow by weakening Ukraine’s ability to coordinate operations and defend against attacks. The scale of that benefit depends on the affected services, duration, and availability of backups. It does not follow that losing one network automatically determines the outcome of the war. The sound conclusion is that dependence creates leverage and additional vulnerability, even when disruption is temporary.”
Similar questions have emerged in the Middle East, where Starlink technology has served both military and civilian purposes during the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran.
In May, Reuters reported that American LUCAS one-way attack drones operating against Iran had used Starlink-related connectivity, prompting disagreements between SpaceX and the Pentagon over service pricing.
According to the report, SpaceX sought to increase the monthly connectivity fee from approximately $5,000 to $25,000 per terminal, arguing that the drones were using a service comparable to its more expensive aviation tier. Pentagon officials objected to the proposed pricing but ultimately agreed to the higher fees, Reuters reported.
Musk disputed the Reuters report, saying that civilian Starlink services had been improperly used for military purposes. The Pentagon also challenged the report, although neither provided detailed evidence contradicting its central findings.
The disagreement highlighted the complications that can arise when military capabilities depend on commercial technologies governed by contractual terms and pricing arrangements.
In Iran itself, Starlink has played a different role.
Iranian authorities have repeatedly restricted internet access during periods of political unrest, leaving satellite connections among the limited means available to some residents seeking to communicate with the outside world.
The authorities have responded by confiscating unauthorized terminals and attempting to disrupt satellite connections.
In October, a senior Iranian official claimed that the government had successfully disabled Starlink terminals during protests earlier in the year. The extent of those efforts has not been independently established.
King cautioned against drawing conclusions about the military uses of Starlink from evidence of its availability to Iranian civilians.
“Separately, satellite internet has helped some Iranians communicate during state-imposed blackouts, while authorities have confiscated terminals and used jamming. Civilian access and military connectivity must be assessed separately; evidence of one does not establish a particular targeting or intelligence mission.”
Bolder also discussed proposals to supply Starlink terminals to Iranian opposition groups. Such initiatives, he suggested, could extend a commercial provider’s influence well beyond the communications industry.
“Should they be responsible for such a thing? Shouldn’t there be some rules on this? I wonder.”
For European countries, Ukraine’s experience has added urgency to a longstanding debate about dependence on American military and technological capabilities.
Other satellite communications providers are developing services for government and defense customers, but there is no straightforward way to substitute one network for another in the middle of an armed conflict.
King said the problem is more specific than a lack of competition.
“I would describe SpaceX’s position as an acute concentration of operational dependence, rather than a proven monopoly over all military satellite communications. Other providers exist. The difficulty is replacing the particular combination of network capacity, suitable terminals and integration into existing operations.”
Bolder focused on the political consequences of Europe’s relationship with the United States.
“We trusted the US, and we did a lot of business with the US, and we depended on the US, and now you see that the trust is gone but the dependency is still there and we’ve maneuvered ourselves in a position where we can be blackmailed,” he warned.
European governments have begun pursuing greater independence through programs such as IRIS², the European Union’s planned secure satellite communications constellation.
Under an agreement announced in August, the project will expand to 348 satellites, with initial launches planned for 2029 and services introduced progressively thereafter.
The constellation is intended to provide secure communications for European governments, defense forces, and emergency services. However, its development cannot immediately replace the capabilities Ukraine currently needs.
Bolder argued that Europe must diversify its strategic dependencies, even if doing so requires substantial investment.
King placed greater emphasis on building resilience into existing arrangements. Governments, he said, should establish clear rules determining who may authorize changes to services, how emergency restrictions are handled, and what obligations providers have to maintain connectivity during military operations.
Independent communications systems should also be available and regularly tested so that military operations can continue if a primary network becomes unavailable.
The debate reflects a broader shift in military planning. NATO recognized space as an operational domain in 2019, acknowledging the importance of satellite systems for communications, intelligence, surveillance, and military coordination.
Ukraine’s experience has demonstrated that possessing advanced military technology is not enough when the communications infrastructure supporting it can be restricted by another party.
King said the disputes surrounding Starlink should prompt governments to reconsider how they measure military readiness.
“For future conflicts, the measure of strength will be whether a force can keep making decisions when its preferred network becomes unavailable. Starlink has shown the extraordinary value of commercial innovation. Governments now need to match that innovation with dependable agreements, practical alternatives, and accountable public decisions.”
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