War Without End: 300 Days of Israel’s Multifront Conflict
Israel intends to intensify its attacks on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, dismantle Hamas in Gaza, and deter the Houthis in Yemen from further attacks—but experts are uncertain whether these goals can be accomplished simultaneously
By Nathan Klabin/The Media Line
After 300 days since the October 7 attacks, Israel has no clear end in sight to the war, which has now spread to three fronts. Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah at Israel’s northern border, and the Houthis in Yemen each pose a distinct threat to Israel and distinct objectives: freeing the hostages, dismantling Hamas, deterring Hezbollah without escalating attrition, preventing the Houthi threat, avoiding a new war front in the West Bank, and balancing security and humanitarian concerns in the whole region. Experts say that an absolute victory for Israel on all these fronts is unlikely.
Hezbollah in Lebanon
On Saturday night, the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel intensified when a rocket launched from Lebanon killed 12 Israeli children. The victims, ranging in age from 10 to 16, were playing on a soccer field in the Druze town of Majdal Shams.
The Israeli military blamed Hezbollah for the attacks, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said there was “every indication” that the rocket came from Hezbollah. Hezbollah has denied launching the attack.
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security President Efraim Inbar told The Media Line that Hezbollah may have denied launching the attack in order to avoid conflict with the Druze, a religious group that has 250,000 practitioners in Lebanon.
Noting that the attack could have been a misfire by Hezbollah, Inbar said, “I doubt it was anyone else. Hezbollah has full control over that area.”
Despite pressure on the Israeli military to counter with a strong response, Israel will likely try to maintain its policy of avoiding further escalation, Inbar said.
Hezbollah, too, has been careful to carry out a war of attrition with Israel, avoiding sparking an all-out military conflict.
“Hezbollah has been successful in two respects,” Inbar explained. “First, about 80,000 Israelis were forced to leave the area. Second, the need to concentrate Israeli forces along the border in case of an escalation has impacted our ability to deploy military forces in Gaza. This influences what we are doing in Gaza due to a lack of enough forces.”
Professor Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, told The Media Line that the attack on Majdal Shams may damage Hezbollah’s international reputation.
“They understand that they will be harshly criticized by the international community and even might legitimize a severe Israeli response,” Michael said.
Dr. Boaz Shapira of the Alma Center, a research center dedicated to studying the security challenges on Israel’s northern borders, told The Media Line that Israel’s military actions against Hezbollah have been significant so far. The Israeli military has destroyed over 4,000 Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, including high-value targets like missile depots and command and control headquarters, he said.
“Having said that, Hezbollah’s main abilities, as well as most of its strategic abilities, haven’t been severely damaged, and it is still fully operating,” Shapira said.
According to the Israeli military, Israel has taken out more than 60 Hezbollah commanders since the start of the war. In the past nine months, Hezbollah has escalated its offensive, 9,450 rockets and mortar shells from Lebanon toward northern Israel, internally displacing over 53,000 from their homes.
Estimates by the INSS assess that Hezbollah remains fully operational despite recent losses. Their forces comprise regular soldiers and reservists estimated between 50,000 to 100,000 fighters with external support from Shiite activists, including from neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq. This bulk includes the Radwan force, a commando unit with combat experience from the conflicts in Syria, numbering some 2,500 fighters, but probably more. Hezbollah’s vast arsenal includes some 150,000-200,000 rockets, mortar bombs, and missiles, of which hundreds are highly precise. Hezbollah is also equipped with high-quality C802 surface-to-air missiles, made in China, and the Russian-made Yakhont; sophisticated and improved Kornet anti-tank missiles, capable of launching mortar bombs; and anti-aircraft missiles capable of hitting UAVs and helicopters. In addition, the fighting force is equipped with UAVs, most of them self-produced for attack and intelligence missions to a range of up to 400 km, and hundreds of drones for various tactical missions.
One of Israel’s military aims in Lebanon is removing Hezbollah from the area south of the Litani River, as was agreed to at the end of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Some say that doing so will require a land incursion into southern Lebanon.
“Hezbollah has entrenched itself in south Lebanon and other areas. It will not voluntarily let go of its hold on these areas,” Shapira said. “Our data shows more than 60% of killed Hezbollah members are originally from south Lebanon. That means that every deal in which Hezbollah withdraws from south Lebanon will necessitate forcing people out of their homes. There is no UN mechanism or a peacekeeping force that can remove them from the region or assure Israel that there won’t be more attacks.”
Hamas in Gaza
Since the deadly Hamas incursion on October 7, the Israeli military has set out to destroy Hamas in Gaza. Some experts question whether that goal is possible and whether it can be done while also bringing home the dozens of hostages still held in Gaza.
Israel has said that it has no interest in occupying Gaza, which has a population of about 2 million, but that it must have the ability to enter the strip when a potential threat is identified. According to the IDF, since October 7, more than 9,100 rockets and projectiles have been fired from Gaza toward Israel. Having already destroyed hundreds of miles of tunnels in Gaza, the IDF didn’t provide exact numbers of what they had already found or an estimate of how many remains; however, experts and military leaders all agree that many more miles of terrorist tunnels are yet to be found. Most recently, between July 9 and July 10, 12 terrorist tunnels were destroyed in Shejaiya by the IDF, eliminating more than 150 terrorists, and dismantling terrorist infrastructure, including booby-trapped buildings and explosives. In addition, the soldiers located dozens of weapons and intelligence documents that the terrorists left behind.
Inbar said that the first stage of the military operation in Gaza is almost complete. “We’re now in the mopping-up phase, which requires fewer forces than the initial operations. The IDF’s mission to destroy Hamas’ military capabilities is nearly accomplished,” he said.
He noted that challenges such as tunnel warfare, ammunition shortages, and the ongoing hostage crisis complicated the operation.
Michael said that Israel has mostly dismantled Hamas’ governmental and military capacity. “We’ve destroyed most of their organized military formations, making it impossible for them to operate against Israel in a centralized military form,” he said. He noted that Hamas has shifted to guerilla tactics in response.
“Another significant achievement is gaining control over the Philadelphi corridor and the Rafah crossing, effectively disconnecting Hamas from its primary means of smuggling weapons, explosives, money, and other materials, severely limiting its capabilities,” Michael said. “This is crucial militarily and economically, as Hamas used to gain significant financial benefits by taxing goods coming through the crossing.”
According to the Israeli military press desk, Israel has eliminated half of Hamas’ military leadership and killed or arrested approximately 14,000 terrorists since October 7.
Inbar was hesitant about the viability of totally eliminating Hamas in Gaza.
“It’s not possible to completely purge Gaza of Hamas, not 100%,” he said. “The goal is to transform Gaza into an area with no military infrastructure, allowing the IDF to enter and eliminate threats as needed. Full pacification isn’t realistic, at least for the near future. There will always be elements opposed to Israel. The objective is to ensure Gaza can’t be used as a platform for Iranian proxies to attack Israel.”
He laid out three potential scenarios for Gaza’s future. Gaza might become akin to Area A in the West Bank, a Palestinian enclave in which civil and security matters are administered by the Palestinian Authority. Internal Palestinian conflict between various political groups might break out, plunging Gaza into a sort of civil war. Or external forces could insist that elections be held in Gaza, which would be the first since 2006. In that case, Gaza might continue to exist as a Hamas-controlled entity.
“Israel doesn’t want to be responsible for Gaza’s 2 million people and the resulting burden,” Inbar said. “Occupying Gaza would mean constant attacks and the need for continuous military presence, which isn’t desirable.”
Michael said that the intensive fighting in Gaza would likely finish up in a few weeks. “But Israel will continue with ground invasions and aerial attacks as needed,” he said. “Once there is a hostage deal, Israel may withdraw from key areas like the Philadelphi corridor, but only under conditions that prevent the renewal of smuggling and ensure our security.”
He described the creation of a temporary military administration in Gaza as “crucial.” “This administration would ensure that humanitarian aid is distributed without Hamas’ interference, weakening their ability to sustain themselves,” he said. “It also signals to the local population that Hamas is no longer a viable option.”
Over time, he said, control of Gaza ought to transition from a temporary military administration to a regional or international task force.
Recently, at least two officials from the United Arab Emirates diplomatic body indicated that the UAE would consider participating in a peacekeeping force in Gaza.
Houthis in Yemen
Houthi attacks on Israel have been another complicating factor in the war. Although the Houthis’ home country of Yemen does not share a land border with Israel, Houthi fighters have managed to attack the Israeli Red Sea city of Eilat. Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea have resulted in a near-complete closure of Eilat Port. According to unverified claims, more than 200 projectiles were launched at Israel.
Although precise estimations of the Houthis arsenal aren’t available, the American Defense Intelligence Agency has publicly shared evidence that Iranian weapons are being smuggled to the Houthis to conduct land and sea-based attacks across the Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. According to the report, “critical components of various missiles were seized and, upon further analysis, found to share near-identical features with Iranian missile systems. Between 2015 and 2024, the United States and its partners have interdicted at least 20 Iranian smuggling vessels, seizing ballistic, cruise, and surface-to-air missile components, antitank guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other illicit weapons destined for the Houthis.”
Earlier this month, the Houthis launched a drone attack in Tel Aviv that killed one civilian. Israel responded by striking the Houthi-controlled port of Al Hudaydah in western Yemen, showcasing the Israeli military’s ability to strike more than 1,300 miles away.
Most of the Houthis’ attacks on Israel have been intercepted, but the Israeli military is reaching its strategic limit.
In response to Houthi obstruction to international shipping, the US launched an international coalition against the Houthis. Inbar described that coalition as “ineffective” in its attempts to deter the armed group. “However, Israel’s actions against the Houthis might incentivize a stronger international response,” he said.
“The idea that the Houthis are still blocking the Red Sea waterways despite the US already being in the region is unacceptable,” Michael said.
The Houthis have been engaged in a conflict with Saudi Arabia since the Saudi-led invasion of Yemen in 2015. Active fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has recently simmered down.
Inbar said that continued Houthi attacks in the Red Sea might lead Saudi Arabia to start fighting with the Houthis once again.
“There is a possibility that cooperation will go beyond allowing the IDF to fly in Saudi airspace, as it’s a possibility that Saudis will deploy troops and restart the war with the Houthis,” he said. “If the US escalates against the Houthis, there is a chance that Iran will stop supporting them.”
Violence in the West Bank
Professor Chuck Freilich, a senior researcher at INSS and former Israel’s national security establishment, assessed that the IDF achieved “remarkable success in keeping West Bank and Jerusalem largely quiescent, especially considering the potential for violence and compared to what happened recently,” he said.
Considering the multifront war Israel is currently fighting, there “have also been a few major [IDF] raids that successfully addressed terror threats and growing Hamas influence in West Bank. All this is crucial because we are already fighting a multifront war and do not need further expansion,” Professor Freilich explained.
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